

Documentary Theory and the Dialectic: A Dialectical Critical Realist Approach

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Introduction:

Documentary Theory & the Return of the Dialectic

The essential and defining feature of the documentary film is the claim that there is a pre-filmic reality with which the film establishes a relationship. Such a defining statement might sound fairly uncontroversial if not trite in Critical Realist circles but within the Humanities, realism has had until lately a very tenuous existence. Accordingly there has always been something almost scandalous about the documentary film as theory has shuttled between naïve realism, where the film was deemed to offer an unmediated relationship with reality, and irrealism, where the emphasis on the mediating properties of the film was such that reality itself was called into question.

It is our contention that the impasse between naïve realism and irrealism can be transcended by recognizing that the relationship between the film and the pre-filmic reality is a dialectical one. To say this is of course to invite a good share of opprobrium in most circles, for the dialectic is a most controversial concept. It is in this context that we welcome Stella Bruzzi's recent book where the dialectic is at last given a place within documentary theory (Bruzzi, 2000).

However her dialectic would appear to be Ionian¹ rather than Eleatic in origin with the documentary film marking an inevitable descent or a fall from an original unity. Yet unlike traditional versions of the Ionian dialectic there is, for Bruzzi, no return ascent to the lost unity. Within her version the filmmaker is seen as embarking on the

quest to recover the lost unity, but for her this a doomed and hopeless adventure. The documentary is seemingly fated never to 'recapture that first fine careless rapture'.

Though Bruzzi's attempt to revive the dialectic and indicate what role it should play in documentary theory, is to be welcomed, there are difficulties with the particular dialectic that she has unfolded. At one level the problem with such a deterministic dialectic is that it brackets out in advance that which needs to be analysed, for instance whether some documentaries get us closer to an understanding of reality than other documentaries. At a deeper level however we would argue that Bruzzi offers us an inverted version of identity thinking, where for here an unmediated reality is the Holy Grail that can never be found; hence the despair.

The Bhaskarian Dialectic

As an alternative approach we employ the Bhaskarian dialectic with its four levels. - 1M or first moment, 2E or second edge, 3L or third level and 4D or fourth dimension (Bhaskar, 1993: 8-14). 1M gives us, the gap between subject and object and in filmic terms the moment of mediation. Documentary films are constructed. They do not offer us unmediated access to the pre-filmic reality. Such access is in any case impossible and so it is not a criticism of a documentary film to say that it mediates reality. This is the starting point for analysis and assessment not despair and condemnation.

The Second Edge or 2E constitutes the moment of negation. Everything the filmmaker does negates or transforms or absents some existing state of affairs. This is the level that encodes the passage of time from the geo-historical to the personal, including of course the autobiographical film. The Third Level or 3L is concerned with totality, and its inwardized or internalised form reflexivity, of which more later. The filmmaker and her film are both parts of a totality, one that is, however, partial and open. The necessary distinction here is with the closed or expressive totality of vulgar Marxism, where the economic base determines the ideological superstructure. Other important motifs at 3L include subjectivity and objectivity, and concrete universality.

The Fourth Dimension 4D involves the agency, both of the filmmaker herself and the people she may make the film about. It is worth stressing here the openness of the Bhaskarian totality and the consequent importance of agency within this.

¹ See Bhaskar, R., *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom*, London: Verso, 1993: 17-19 for an overview of the Ionian and Eleatic dialectical traditions.

If 1M and 2E give us a refutation of both naïve realism and poststructuralist scepticism, it is 3L that supplies us with the possibility of a context sensitive reading of the film's production and reception. It is indeed 3L that empowers the process of radical critique. Moreover a consideration of the 4D level of the dialectic, with its emphasis on the filmmaker as agent, enables us to situate and account for, as we shall see, the *avant garde* tendency within contemporary documentary theory known as the 'aesthetics of failure'.

Applying the Bhaskarian Dialectic: reflexivity and the documentary

The levels of the Bhaskarian dialectic do not represent separate moments. They co-mingle in reality. Thus a consideration of both 3L and 4D gives us the basis for a critical account of the concept of reflexivity, from which the aesthetics of failure have developed.

Bhaskar begins his discussion of reflexivity with an account of Hegel's notion of 'the pre-reflective reasonableness of ordinary life'. This tolerates contradictions and finds nothing problematic in them. It is this pre-reflective thought which Brecht sought to disrupt with the estrangement effect. The crucial aspect of Brecht's 'epic theatre' was that the spectator was not provided simply with sensations. He was instead expected to make decisions, that is, to reflect. He was required to stand outside and not to be involved with the action. There was a range of technical devices designed to produce this non-cathartic result. They included short discrete scenes, 'jumps' and montage (Brecht, 1979: 360- 1).

Reflexivity is defined as we have seen as 'the inwardised form of totality' (Bhaskar, 1993: 9). It is necessary for 'accountability and the monitoring of intentional causal agency' (Bhaskar, 1993: 403). The argument here is a transcendental one. We act in this world and that would not be possible if we had not interiorised the reality principle, that is, the realisation that there is a world out there for us to act upon. Above this level is the ability to totalise our life situation and to meta-reflect on it. Thus we can think not only about what we are doing but we can think on how we got to be where we are. We can also at times do "two things at once". Because we are stratified human beings we retain during any task a range of capacities to do other things.

It is a truism, of course that our interactions with reality are inexorably linguistic. At the level of each of our personal life cycles we will always be in what the structuralists were fond of calling "the prison-house of language". What the structuralists were apt to

do, however, was to forget the duality of language. It **is** metaphorical. It **is** expressive. But it also refers to reality both conversationally and practically. We can moreover perform the task of referential detachment when we recognise and acknowledge the otherness of reality. For Bhaskar the being-expressiveness of language is contained within an overarching objectivity which is ‘the condition of the possibility of everything we call “human”’ (1993: 150).

In the case of documentary film the demand for reflexivity has become the demand for a particular reflexive style. There is a deep confusion at work here. It is possible for a film, such as Trinh T. Minh-ha’s *Surname Viet: Given Name Nam* (1989), to be extremely reflexive about how it is made. Yet at the same time to be distinctly short on the notion of offering us a meta-reflexive self-totalisation of both the subject matter and the film maker. The problem here exists at 3L of the dialectic. Stylistic flourishes are not in themselves a guarantee that the filmmaker has acknowledged the totalities within which she and her film subjects live and work.

For instance in her film, Trinh points out how the Vietnamese revolution has not led to an improvement in the lives of Vietnamese women. What she does not do, however, is to situate herself, and her critique and the struggles of the Vietnamese people. The latter successfully repelled the American invasion in 1975. They were subsequently subjected to economic sanctions that determined to a large extent the fate of the revolution. Trinh as a member of the Vietnamese diaspora and a feminist is concerned about the fate of Vietnamese women, and rightly so. However one wonders to what extent a pro-feminist attack on the treatment of women in Vietnam is a cover for a critique of the Vietnamese revolution. This question can only be answered by inserting Trinh within a partial totality (the Vietnamese diaspora) at 3L. One must also consider her at 4D as an agent who has made a range of choices that have both artistic and political implications determined in this instance by the **limits** of the reflexivity within her film.

By contrast it is possible, for a film such as Cecil Holmes’ *The Islanders* (1968) to transcend its non-reflexive style. In the final scene of this film portraying the departure of the migrant workers Holmes cheats by first picturing the men getting into the boat and then placing a camera in the boat so we end the film looking at the grieving relatives on shore. This is non-reflexive film making at its very best and the scene is extraordinarily moving. Equally importantly, however, in allowing three of the islanders to talk about

their lives throughout the film, Holmes comes as close as he dare in the context of an official film to a meta-reflexive totalising (3L&4D) of the lives of the islanders.

The Documentary Tradition: The Griersonian Legacy

A critique of the current fetishization of reflexivity must not attempt to differentiate the concept but also account for it in terms of its relationship with its Other- the expository documentary favoured by the Griersonian tradition. It is well known that the fundamental aim of John Grierson's project was to use film to enforce a sense of citizenship within the community. There was a place for everyone and everyone was to be in their place. The role of film was to explain both to the postal worker etc and the rest of the nation how she fitted into the grand scheme of things.

Currently there would appear to be a deepening of the rejection of the Griersonian tradition and this arguably would seem to be determining the style of the contemporary documentary. In many ways the reaction against the Griersonian tradition is due to the realisation of just how deeply the Grierson's legacy has penetrated contemporary news gathering, film making, reportage, Cultural Studies etc. Here John Hartley's article *Housing Television: Textual Traditions in TV and Cultural Studies* is acquiring the status of a definitive reading not only of the documentary *Housing Problems* but also of Grierson's legacy (Hartley 1998). Brian Winston (1995) had of course called for a rejection of the Griersonian tradition, but Hartley's, as far as we are aware, was the first to attempt to build the rejection of Griersonianism into a programmatic statement about the entire direction of Cultural Studies.

Housing Problems (1935), itself, was made for a number of state corporations. It is in many ways a typical product of the Grierson School in that its central concern is to inform the citizenry of their duties and to reassure them that their betters are aware of their needs. To achieve this the film employs the Problem-Solution paradigm. In this instance the problem is that of slum clearance and the solution is to demolish the old houses and to resettle the displaced communities in high rise flats.

Housing Problems is regarded as an important film, partly because it marked the early use of synchronous sound on location. Contemporary critics however, such as John Hartley, Brian Winston, Michael Renov, while acknowledging its importance have been very scathing about both the composition and impact of this film. Yet in

the face of this consensus one should note Raymond Williams' reference to the film's 'superb demotic style' (Williams in Aspinall, 1980: 148). Hartley on the other hand builds an argument for *Housing Problems* as the *locus classicus* of the baleful influence of his hated 'knowledge class' (Hartley in Lusted & Geraghty, 1998). Nevertheless even in this case of such a glaring disagreement between two distinguished critics it is possible to examine the arguments advanced and to come to the conclusion that Hartley's case is much stronger. Moreover we would argue that Williams' views are influenced by an overly sanguine approach to the Griersonian project the passing of which he bitterly regretted (Williams, R., 1979: 71).

Nevertheless there are two brief moments in the film, when the working-class are observed sitting, playing, and relaxing in their alley ways. Here the film records faithfully and very movingly the deep communality of working class life. Yet as Hartley has pointed out it is precisely this communality that the housing experts so successfully destroyed (Personal communication, 2001). Moreover these brief sequences are sandwiched in between interviews where the working class residents of the slums are paraded in front of the camera to discuss their houses. In these sequences the workers in the awkwardness of their speech seem very much to be prisoners in the class war, tokens of conquest for the master class.

The film still reeks with smugness born out of nothing less than a conviction of class superiority. *Housing Problems* presents itself as faithful recorder of what is. But of course it selects and shapes and distorts (1M). There is no sense at all of what is being negated (2E) by the film and the actions it is championing. Nor is there any acknowledgment of the totalities within which the filmmakers and the housing experts are situated (3L). Most seriously of all the working class subjects in the film are by and large deprived of any sense of agency (4D). Their historical fate is to be acted on by experts following a period of surveillance. Their task is to be grateful.

The Avant Garde Alternatives

Narcissism or the Struggle for Amour de Soi

The retreat from the legacy of the Grierson can also seemingly take the form of the embrace of narcissism. There is a very interesting photograph in John Roberts - Florence Henri's 1928 self-portrait (Roberts, 1998: 56). She studied at the Bauhaus

and then took up portrait photography and fashion work. This particular photograph shows her contemplating herself in the mirror. It is 1928 and the world is crashing around her into the Great Depression, yet she sits there contemplating her own image. Roberts' comment is interesting. He says 'These images of mirrors do not so much extend the everyday as a gendered space as embrace narcissism as a recoil from the everyday' (Roberts, 1998: 55). For Roberts photographs, such as Henri's, reveal that there was some negotiation of, if not opposition to, the dominant positivism that was to constitute the basis for documentary photography in the 1930s and beyond.

The term 'narcissism', which Roberts employs, has irredeemably negative connotations. However we need to ask whether gestures such as Henri's are merely the self-absorbed (*amour propre*) or do they manifest self-esteem (*amour de soi*). The distinction is an important one for as Bhaskar has pointed out, 'only the empowered individual can assist or effectively solidarize with the powerless, so that *amour de soi*, rather than *amour propre*, is the true fount of all altruism (Bhaskar, 1993: 265). The autobiographical gesture in photography and documentary may then be based on a reactionary narcissism but it may also be something like a return to the Self as a way of finding healing (Bhaskar, 2000). It may indeed constitute the first step of Bhaskar's dialectic of the '7 E's'.

Self-esteem ↔ mutual esteem (where the intra-dependency of action itself reflects both the fiduciary nature of the social bond and the reality of oppressive social relations) existential security ↔ ergonic efficiency ↔(individual →collective →totalising) empowerment ↔ universal emancipation ↔ eudaimonia (Bhaskar, 1993: 365).

The point we wish to stress here is that, although Brian Winston is correct to point out the complex ethical issues involved, the personal autobiographical film may not necessarily be an instance of the 'me generation' at work (Winston, 2000: 130). There is an alternative dialectic leading, as Bhaskar has shown from, *amour de soi* or self-esteem to the good society.

The Aesthetics of Failure

Paul Arthur (1993) was we believe the first theorist to attempt to encapsulate the key aspect of the new Avant Garde Documentary with the concept of the 'aesthetics of failure' (Arthur in Renov, 1993). Jon Dovey employs the term 'klutz films' to describe the same phenomena (Dovey, 200: 27-54). However we will stick with Arthur's formulation, as we feel that the use of the term klutz tends to oversimplify differences between the authorial personae created within the aesthetics of failure. Thus Nick Broomfield and Ross McIlwee both encounter failure but the failures are of a very different order, as are the personalities constructed within the film.

'Epistemic hesitation', a term analogous to the 'aesthetics of failure', has been advocated by Carl Plantinga (1997). We will return to Plantinga, but for the moment we will note that for him 'epistemic hesitation' constitutes a possible source of balance to the cognitive triumphalism of the traditional expository documentary.

The essential features of the 'aesthetics of failure' are that the filmmaker is reflexive in the *cinema verité* mode. Thus there is much discussion and foregrounding of how the filmmaker is making a film and what **his** intentions are. The defining feature of the genre, though, is that the filmmaker presents **himself** as incompetent, and struggling to keep the film project on track.

We have chosen to underline the gender implications of this new documentary genre, because although, as Arthur and Dovey both argue, it represents the erosion of the white male as subject, the white male remains centre stage - troubled, incompetent, bumbling etc but nevertheless centre stage². Indeed it is debatable to what extent the aesthetics of failure represents an avenue of expression for the female filmmaker. Within patriarchy the male master can play at being incompetent but no such license is extended to the female slave who must always strive to prove herself in a male dominated world.³

Within the aesthetics of failure paradigm there are two great *maîtres* - Michael Moore and Ross McIlwee. In many ways people have not yet come to terms with what their work signifies. McIlwee, in our opinion, is the greater artist, but Moore is a very accomplished filmmaker. His *Roger and Me* is widely acknowledged as a classic.

² There are interesting parallels here with Helen Yeates' work on the agein male especially as represented in *NYPD*.

³ We are grateful to Debbie Beattie of Griffith University for the basis of this insight.

Moore is also more explicitly political than McIlwee. But it is not at all clearly understood what the nature of his politics is. They are classically liberal communitarian and they go back to John Dewey not Karl Marx. The whole thrust of his art is to expel the rich and the powerful from the community. He attempts to demonstrate over and over again that they are un-American. At the other end of the pole from this liberal communitarianism is McIlwee who represents the individual who will not conform, who in the face of a triumphalist culture built round 'can do will do', offers us his personal failures.

Plantinga & Epistemic Hesitation

It is the absence of a critical-realist philosophy of science that handicaps Plantinga in his attempt to refute the cognitive triumphalism of what he terms the 'formal voice'. Likewise his attack on postmodernist scepticism, which lies behind the concept of the open voice, is weakened because he does not have a theory which will locate the proper place for epistemic relativism or what he terms 'epistemic hesitation' (Plantinga, 1997: 118).

It is this that is behind his mistaken contrast between explanation and exploration. Plantinga does not see that if we recognise that the world is stratified then all explanation is like exploration. Epistemic relativism is not an optional extra. It is guaranteed by the fact that 'all beliefs are socially produced, so that all knowledge is transient, and neither truth-values nor criteria for rationality exist outside historical time' (Bhaskar, 1979: 73). Epistemic relativism then is the very essence of our epistemological endeavours. It is however most important to understand that epistemic relativism does not preclude ontological realism. Reality exists and is stratified. Neither should we abandon the notion of judgemental rationality. We do have good reasons for preferring one explanation to another.

We would like to say a further word about Plantinga's notion of 'epistemic hesitation'. This can be usefully compared with Paul Arthur's notion of the 'aesthetics of failure' and regarded primarily as a psychological and sociological phenomenon (Arthur, 1993: 16-34). At one level it is true that this hesitation, doubt or uncertainty about the epistemological project is caused by the collapse of the certainties of positivism. There is, though, a social/political moment as well. We locate this in the failure of the Left of 1966-72 to bring about substantial social change. This failure has seen in turn the continued triumph of the dominant elites.

In terms of the Bhaskarian dialectic we are dealing with problems at 4D - the level of agency. Here the 'de-agentification of reality' has given risen to, what Bhaskar terms the 'world historical problem of agency', where there is an apparent absence of 'the deep totalizing conveyors of the dialectic of freedom' (Bhaskar, 1993: 316). So great are the problems that arguably we are at a stage where the only alternative source of opposition is to fetishize indeterminacy and so undermine the categories that underpin the status quo. In other words the function of the 'aesthetics of failure' and 'epistemic hesitation' is to negate **all** epistemic certainty.

However this is at best a holding operation and it is interesting to note that, as Plantinga points out, there is a revival of documentaries, which have a 'formal voice' in that they attempt to explain reality. It is our contention that we should reject epistemic hesitation as **an end in itself**. Firstly on the grounds that it confuses the notion of epistemic relativism and also that it denies the possibility of achieving truth as alethia or the reason for things. Our second reason for rejecting 'epistemic hesitation' is that explanation is essential to emancipation. We must understand the world before we can change it. Moreover, indeterminacy by itself does not suffice to advance freedom. For that something must be negated.

The Aesthetics of Delirium (AoD)

The notion of 'delirium' is yet another instance of the under theorised in contemporary documentary theory. It emerged first in response to Bill Nichol's call for a more serious approach to documentary. Michael Renov has labelled the latter's position as the 'discourses of sobriety' and called for documentary theory and practice to move to the AoD. So then we can initially understand the AoD through the *via negativa*, that is they are not the discourses of sobriety.

Obviously this is an unsatisfactory situation and we must hope that Renov clarifies the concept of AoD. In the mean time we would argue that we can make some contribution to the process of concept development and clarification by situating AoD within a line of thought, which stretches from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Roughly speaking this is a tradition that privileges the irrational over the rational. The key text here is Nietzsche's (1844-1900) *The Birth of Tragedy* first published in 1872. This deals with the clash between the aesthetic and the rational.

Nietzsche's argument is in effect that the rationalism initiated by Socrates destroyed Greek tragedy.

Before addressing that argument it is important to note that Nietzsche's starting point is one he took from Schopenhauer. This is an affirmation of the essential horror of existence. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche outlines the motif of the wisdom of Silenus as follows:

According to the old story, King Midas had long haunted wise Silenus, Dionysus' companion, without catching him. When Silenus had finally fallen into his clutches, the king asked him what was the best and most desirable thing of all for mankind. The daemon stood, silent, stiff and motionless, until at last, forced by the king, he gave a shrill laugh and spoke these words: 'Miserable, ephemeral race, children of hazard and hardship, why do you force me to say what it would be much more fruitful for you not to hear? The best of all things is something entirely outside your grasp: not to be born, not to *be*, to be *nothing*. But the second best thing for you - is to die soon (Nietzsche, 1993: 22)".

How then is one to react to the wisdom of Silenus? We will deal with Nietzsche's response later but firstly let us consider the attitude of his mentor, the great pessimist, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). For the latter 'Work, worry, toil, and trouble are indeed the lot of almost all men their whole life long' (Schopenhauer, 1962: 43). His response to the horror of being alive was a kind of ascetic stoical acceptance. For Schopenhauer the problem lay with humanity's Will, in this case the will to live. Will was the source of all suffering in the world. In this he was influenced strongly by Buddhist thought and believed that the only solution was to absent desire. Interestingly he also argued that the aesthetic could provide a space apart, a sort of zone of temporary relief from the Will (Schopenhauer, 1970: 156-8). This is possible because for Schopenhauer art and the aesthetic belong to the world of Platonic Ideas rather than that of the Will.

Nietzsche seems to have taken Schopenhauer notion of the Will and transformed it into the Will to Power. This was said to be the defining aspect of what it is to be human. From this there is a direct line to Foucault and post modern thought. Within this schema truth becomes a matter of power. One asserts one's truth over someone else's and sets up what Foucault called 'regimes of truth'. If one adds in here Nietzsche's perspectivalism, that is the view that truth is a matter of perspective and

disagreements are really clashes over perspectives then one really has all the essential ingredients for the postmodernist truth-stew.

Another difference between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer was over the former's response to the horror of existence. Nietzsche formed a notion called the Eternal Return. That which is will be again forever and ever. He then decided that he would say 'yes' to this fate. This was the heroic response of the philosopher-intellectual. He regarded this as a decisive break with Schopenhauer's pessimism.

In terms of the specificity of aesthetics, Nietzsche saw the aesthetic as a way of responding to the horror of existence. The example he took here is ancient Greek tragedy. This for Nietzsche had the two-fold divisions within the aesthetic. - the Dionysian and the Apollonian. Dionysus was the god of the collective ecstasy - the Bacchanalian rite. Here one lost one's individuality in the great collectivist frenzy. From a Bhaskarian perspective what is interesting is the attempt to achieve subject-object identity and to merge with the world. We will return to this demand for the unmediated when we come to discuss Reality television but for the moment we will note that this is exactly what hippies and mystics have long attempted to achieve. Such attempts are doomed to only temporary moments of success. As any middle aged man will tell you, it is not given for humans to dwell in the ecstatic for more than a transitory moment.

In any case we think of the Dionysian moment in terms of the Old Star Wars notion of 'the force' in that it has a dark and a light side. In addition apart from Dionysus there is Apollo the god of light and of form and beauty. If according to Nietzsche music was essentially Dionysian then the Apollonian was most represented by those arts such as sculpture that stressed form.

For Nietzsche the great work of art combined the Dionysian with the Apollonian. He saw this in the Greek tragedy, which had its interplay between the chorus (Dionysian) and the action of the hero (Apollonian). This was the high point of art. However when Euripides came on the scene he removed the chorus and thus in Nietzsche's terms destroyed Greek tragedy. Without the Dionysian, the Apollonian withered.

Euripides, again according to Nietzsche, was dominated by Socrates. So the latter is the real villain for Nietzsche. Socrates' sin was that he was a hyper rationalist and downplayed the irrational or the Dionysian. Our argument in this instance is that both Winston and Renov in their attempts to renew the documentary theory and form have

been searching for a figure on whom they can pin the mantle of Socrates. Winston seems to have settled for Grierson as Socrates, while Renov has selected Nichols to fill that role. Interestingly Hartley in his review of *Housing Problems* would seem to have the same target as Winston.

It is our contention or suspicion perhaps that very little of this has been thought out. It may be that Winston and Renov are both instinctive rather than clearly thought out Nietzscheans. Clearly there is a lot more work has to be done, but at least we would argue that laying the problem out as above does enable us to advance a number of relevant questions. Primarily we think that it is worthwhile being a little resistant to Renov's rhetoric. Before we put on our dancing shoes and join him kicking in the chorus and having a hot time in the old town tonight, it is worthwhile to recall that sometimes the oppressed need above all the truth to be told about their exploitation.

It is also important to question the Nietzschean reading of the Socratic. There is, for instance, no doubt that Hartley is sincere in his loathing of the 'knowledge class' (experts) who devise solutions for the working class. Moreover his sceptical outrage at those who see the working class as a problem, is to be applauded. Equally we share his sense of loss in his mourning for the passing of the working class communities. However not all rationality is on the side of oppression. Not all experts are exploiters. To be anti-expert *per se* is to don the mantle of Pol Pot.

Conclusions

This paper has attempted to advance documentary theory by employing the dialectic. The dialectic we have adapted is the Bhaskarian one, with its four levels encompassing non-identity, negativity, totality and agency. We have attempted to illustrate how this might be applied to a range of problems with documentary theory especially the moments of self-esteem, the aesthetics of failure, epistemic hesitation and delirium. Much work of course remains to be done, however it is our hope that this paper will have made at least in part the case for a Dialectical Critical Realist approach within Documentary Theory.

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