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From: Hans Ehrbar
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Subject: BHA: rts2, Appendix to Chapter 2
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[127]
Appendix
ORTHODOX PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF OPEN SYSTEMS
It may be felt that I have dealt rather summarily in Chapter 2
with some of the most hallowed doctrines of received philosophy
of science; so I want here to turn to a more detailed examination
of them in the light of the phenomenon of open systems.
The structure of orthodox philosophy of science is based
squarely on the Humean theory of the actuality of causal laws.
But it is convenient to give Nicod's criterion,1 which presupposes
and implies it co-equal status. I shall formulate them as two
principles:
P_1, the principle of *empirical-invariance*, viz. that laws are or
depend upon empirical regularities; and
P_2, the principle of *instance-confirmation* (or falsification),
viz. that laws are confirmed (or falsified) by their instances.
Post-Humean philosophy of science has called into question only
the sufficiency, not the necessity of these principles; i.e. it has
left the ontology implicit in them intact. Thus in the most
advanced recent positions theory is regarded as irreducible;
and as supplying at least part of the grounds for laws. The
significance of such modifications will be considered in the
next chapter. Here, as in the body of Chapter 2, I will not
distinguish between philosophers who regard P_1 and/or P_2 as
necessary and sufficient and those who regard them as merely
necessary. Once more no harm will be done by this conflation
as all my objections here turn on the lack of necessity of these
principles and ipso facto of the theories they sustain. It is for
the sake of explanatory convenience and to avoid repetition
1 After J. Nicod, Foundations of Geometry and Induction, p. 219.
See C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, p. 11.
128 A Realist Theory of Science
that I formulate and discuss them in their `necessary and
sufficient' form.
Both P_1 and P_2 depend upon a closure, and hence
upon the assumption of a simple undifferentiated reality.
P_1 gives rise to the truth-functional concept of natural
necessity. This is the idea that the logical status of
laws can be explicated, at least in part, by the formula
"for all x, fx inplies gx," where the predicates `f' and
`g' are defined extensionally or are at least given some
definite empirical interpretation e.g. by means of
correspondence rules. The definition may be ostensive or
operational;2 and if ostensive, either sensationalist3 or
physicalist.4 P_1 is susceptible of descriptivist (Mach)5
and instrumentalist (Ryle)6 interpretations; and of
classical empiricist and transcendental idealist ones.
P_2 is susceptible of inductivist (Carnap)7 and
falsificationist (Popper)8 interpretations; and of
positivist and conventionalist ones.
I am going to use the term `deductivism' to refer to
the ensemble of theories erected on the basis of P_1 and
P_2. My choice of the term `deductivism' may not seem an
altogether happy one in view of the fact that it is meant
to cover philosophers who have regarded themselves, as
`inductivists' and `instrumentalists', as opposed to
`deductivism'. However, I do not think that this is a
serious difficulty. For there is no way in general of
getting an inductive policy going without appealing to an
antecedently formulated lawlike statement. (The
exception is provided by the
2 P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, esp. pp. 1-25.
3 Physics cannot be regarded as validly based upon
empirical data until [light] waves have been expressed as
functions of the colours and other sense-data',
B. Russel, Mysticism and Logic, p. 109.
4 See e.g. O. Neurath, `Universal Jargon and
Terminology', P.A.S. Vol. 41, pp. 127-48.
5 `The communication of scientific knowledge involves
description: that is, the mimetic reproduction of facts
in thought, the object of which is to replace and save
the trouble of new experience. This is all that natural
laws are', E. Mach, Popular Scientific Lectures, p. 192.
6 G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, esp. pp. 116-22.
Cf. also C. S. Pierce, Collected Papers, Vol. 2, p. 354;
F. P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 194-7;
and S. Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, Chap. 3.
7 R. Carnap, The Logical Foundations of Probability or
`Testability and Meaning', Readings in the Philosophy of
Science, eds. H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, pp. 47-92. |
8 K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery,
esp. Chap. 4 or Conjectures and Refutations, Chap. 10.
Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 129
pure Humean case where the events are intuitively
ascertainable atomistic instants, and each event is a
member of a linear series.) For one sequence to give
support to another the antecedent events must be alike in
relevant respects. But to talk of the relevance of the
`respects' already presupposes a tentative (conjectured)
or confirmed law. Hence the inductivist in theory must
be a deductivist in practice. Similarly a rule of
inference can always be recast as the major premise of a
syllogism. That is to say, an inference ticket (a
`season ticket', as Ryle revealingly calls it)9 remains
valid only as long as some empirical generalization is
true. Thus the instrumentalist questions only the
descriptivist interpretation of the use of laws, not
their logical form.
I will first set out the overall structure of
deductivism before examining its components, individually
and collectively, in the light of open systems.
Underpinning deductivism is the actualist thesis
that laws are relations between events or states of
affairs. If the world consists only of atomistic events
or states-of-affairs then for a general knowledge of it
to be possible their relations must be constant. And so
we have P_1 the principle of empirical-invariance
(1) laws are or depend upon constant conjunctions of
events or states of affairs (which constitute the objects
of actual or possible experiences). As such it generates
the familiar Humean theory of causality. This theory is
susceptible of different interpretations, viz.
(2)' as a theory of what we *mean* by saying `X causes
Y', viz. that the events as specified under their
descriptions X and Y are regularly conjoined; and
(2)" as a theory of how we must be prepared to
*justify* the claim that X causes Y, viz. by showing that
the event as specified under these descriptions are
regularly conjoined. In the case of both theories it is
possible to substitute the weaker requirement that the
events be specified under these or some other set of
descriptions. The weaker variants could be indicated by
the subscript_1.
We then have a theory of explanation, that
(3) events are explained by subsuming them under one
or more universal laws; i.e. by deducing them from a set
of one or
9 G. Ryle, op. cit., p. 117.
130 A Realist Theory of Science
more universal laws, together with a statement of their initial
conditions. This has become known as the Popper-Hempel theory
of explanation. Popper was the first to restate it in modern
times10 and Hempel has been its most systemic advocate and
defender.11 It is convenient to divide the theory into two
requirements:
(3a) a *deducibility* requirement, viz. that the
explanandum be deducible from the explanans; and
(3b) a *covering-law* requirement, viz. that the
explanans contain at least one universal law.
Next, a theory of prediction to the effect that
(4) events are predicted by deducing them from a set
of universal laws together with a statement of their
initial conditions. (3) and (4) together give rise to
the theory that
(5) explanation and prediction are symmetrical (in
the sense of (iii) on page 63 above).
On this view their difference lies merely in the
fact that in `explanation' the explanandum event lies in
the past and in `prediction' in the future.
Then we have a theory of the explanation of laws,
namely
(6) laws are explained by subsuming them under or
deducing them from more general, abstract or inclusive
statements. Such statements may be regarded as
theoretical principles or hypotheses. They may be
interpreted descriptively, instrumentally or as fictions.
I leave aside consideration of the various theories of
theories until Chapter 3.
Next a theory of the explanation of theories and
even sciences, viz.
(7) theories and sciences are explained by
deductively subsuming them under more basic or general
ones. The explained theory or science is then said to
have been `reduced' to the explaining one.12 Thus we have
a theory of the development of science, viz.
(7)* science develops monistically or in a linear
fashion so as to leave meaning and truth-value unchanged.
Theories (7) and (7)* are rejected by many philosophers,
most notably Popper, committed to other components of the
10 K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 59.
11 See esp. C. G. Hempel, op. cit., Chap. 12.
12 See E. Nagel, op. cit., Chap. 11.
Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 131
deductivist structure. As Feyerabend has pointed out
these theories generate their own restrictive
methodology, embodied in the conditions that
(7)** theoretical innovations should be consistent
and meaning-invariant with respect to established,
i.e. currently accepted, theory.13
These conditions tend inevitably to have a
conservative effect. And they may be regarded as
rationalizing the practice of what Kuhn has called
`normal science'.14
I do not intend to discuss theories (7)* and (7)**
in any detail here. That will be done in Chapter 3. But
their connection through thesis (7) with the doctrine of
actualism and their consequent dependence upon the
presupposition of a closure should be clear.
According to theses (3), (6), (7) and (7)*, the
explanation of events, laws, theories and sciences all
partake of essentially the same ideal
`deductive-nomological' form. And they share this also
(through theories (2), (4) and (5)) with the activities
of prediction and the identification of causes.
Scientific knowledge then must consist (in part or in
whole) of a deductive structure. But which one? Which
out of all possible deductive structures is the best (or
in Popperian terms, `least worst') ?
Here P_2 gets to work. Thus we have the theories
that:
(8) laws, theories and sciences are directly or
indirectly confirmed or corroborated by their instances
(which constitute the objects of actual or possible
experiences); and
(9) laws, theories and sciences are directly or
indirectly falsified by their counter-instances (which
constitute the objects of actual or possible
experiences). Unless the meaning of theoretical terms is
reduced to ostensively defined instances, as in Machian
descriptivism, such criteria cannot be sufficient, but
they are normally posited as at least necessary. (8) and
(9) have sometimes been interpreted in a conventionalist
way. But as what is regarded as `conventional' is only
the decision to accept a report as being genuinely
`observational' (and so capable of furnishing a genuine
instance or counter-instance of a putative law), a
conventionalist interpretation does not affect the status
of the principle itself.15
13 p. K. Feyerabend, op. cit., p. 164. 14 T. S. Kuhn, op. cit.
Chap. II.
16 Poincare is widely regarded as the founder of
conventionalism in the philosophy of science. For a
conventionalist interpretation of Popper see I. Lakatos,
`Criticism and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Programmes', Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,
eds. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, pp. 104ff.
132 A Realist Theory of Science
Finally, following on from (9), we have a maxim of
scientific practice to the effect that:
(10) scientists should, in formulating their
theories, state quite unambiguously the empirical
conditions under which they are prepared to reject them
(cf (iv) on pp. 63-4 above). This may also be taken as a
criterion of what it is to be `scientific' and
`unscientific', viz.
(10)* to be `unscientific' is not to be prepared to
state such conditions or having done so to revise them ex
post facto.16
Most received philosophy of science is based on a
core extracted from theories (1)-(10).* These theories
all share one great weakness: they all presuppose a
closure. If, as I have argued, the world is in fact open
then they must all be more or less drastically revised
and in some cases completely rejected. I have already
argued against (1) in Chapter 2 (especially section 4) above so
I will not discuss it separately here. It will be
remembered that the criterion of open-ness is the
non-invariance of empirical relationships. Now clearly
if the law-like statements whose antecedents are
instantiated in open systems are interpreted as invariant
empirical regularities they must be regarded as false.
But this means that there can be neither laws, because
there are no invariant empirical regularities; nor
theories, because they are continually being falsified;
so that neither explanation nor prediction can be given a
rational basis. I have examined two actualist responses
to this predicament (viz. weak and strong actualism) and
showed how neither can sustain the concept of laws
applying transfactually, viz. in open and closed systems
alike, that we need to render intelligible both the
experimental establishment and the practical application
of our knowledge.
It is important to keep the deducibility and
covering-law requirements, as expressed in (3a) and (3b)
distinct. For either can be non-trivially satisfied
without the other. I have already shown in 2.6 how one
can have explanation in terms of a network of normic
statements (which may be strictly universal in the
16 See e.g. K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations,
Chap. I and passim.
Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 133
sense of space-time-invariant) without the event being
deducible. Of course the sense in which the covering-law
`covers' in this case is different. In the same way but
from another aspect, the deducibility requirement may be
violated in the development of science although all the
statements involved are universal. An example of this is
given by the way in which Newton's theory both explained
and corrected Kepler's and Galileo's laws.17 In these
cases (3b) is satisfied but not (3a). On the other hand
our atavistic causal explanation `Tania pushed the door
open' is deductive, though no laws are involved. It is
also possible for the deducibility requirement to be
satisfied by statements mentioning named individuals or
specific space-time regions.18 It should be noted that
one can have deductive `explanations' of events under
transient empirical regularities but not deductive
explanations of their explanations: for the space-time
restriction cannot itself be derived from a strictly
universal law.
Thesis (9) implies that all law-like statements
whose antecedents are instantiated in open systems are
false. It is therefore as stated quite useless as a
decision rule for choosing between different law-like
statements (or as an `organon of criticism').19 One way
of dealing with this would be to allow theory a role in
grounding laws. But with an unchanged ontology this is
bound to be ultimately unsatisfactory. Of course if we
possess a good theory it is irrational to relinquish it
in the face of recalcitrant facts - without a better one.
But our justification for holding on to the theory must
be that it might eventually be able to explain them (by
suitable modifications, refinements or developments) or
show that they are not after all facts (i.e. that the
statements used to state them are untrue). If it could
never explain and/or correct them this justification
would collapse. Of course the sufficiency of Nicod's
criterion must be disputed: the grounds for a law or
theory cannot be exclusively empirical. Theory must
supply some idea of a `connection', without which it
would be impossible to tell necessary from accidental
sequences. But in an open world Nicod's criterion cannot
17 See e.g. P. Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical
Theory, Chaps. 9-10.
18 Cf. A. Donagan, `The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered', Philosophical
Analysis and History, ed. W. H. Dray, pp. 136-8.
19 K. R. Popper, Objective Knowledge, p. 21 and passim.
134 A Realist Theory of Science
be necessary either: the grounds for a law or a theory
cannot be undifferentiatedly empirical. For the
conditions must normally be carefully controlled so that
a hypothesis about the connecting mechanism can be put to
a fair test.
If it is wrong to regard law-like statements and
theories as being falsified by the non-occurrence of
their consequents in open systems, it is equally wrong to
regard them as being confirmed or corroborated by their
occurrence in an undifferentiated way, i.e. independently
of the context in which the putatively
falsifying/confirming instance occurs. Theses (9) and
(8) must therefore be restated so as to place a
restriction on the system in which a genuinely
falsifying/confirming instance occurs, viz. that it be
closed.
Not all evidence is equal; or rather not all
evidence is evidence for or against a law. In general it
takes a closed system to furnish evidence capable of
falsifying or confirming a law. And within the class of
closed systems, experimentally closed ones are
preferable.
For experimentally we can test and re-test a greater
number and variety of subjunctive conditionals of the
form `if x were to take on a certain value, then y_j
would occur' by instantiating their antecedents. Whereas
outside the laboratory we are restricted to observing
whatever sequential performances nature is obliging
enough to put on.
Similar considerations apply to thesis (10). One
cannot lay down hard and fast criteria spelling out
beforehand which observable situations `if actually
observed mean the theory is refuted' (see (iv) on
pp. 63-4 above). For one can never know beforehand
whether the system will be actually closed. On the other
hand the closure of the system is not a part of the
observable situation; so that it cannot be incorporated
into the criterion of scientificity without destroying
it. The judgement that the system is closed can only be
made ex post after we have observed (and theoretically
assessed) the observable situation.
Theses (3) and (9) postulate a syntactical identity
between explantion, prediction and falsification in that,
taken together, they imply a correct prediction explains
and an incorrect prediction falsifies. They depend upon
the assumptions that it is possible to give a purely
syntactical account of scientific
Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 135
activities and that these activities always occur in the
context of an antecedently given closure. Recent
philosophy of science has clearly demonstrated the
poverty of the former; it is with the incorrectness of
the latter assumption that I am here concerned.
Now explanation in open systems, failing the
attainment of an antecedent closure, normally requires,
as I have pointed out in 2.6 above, retrodiction; that is
the inference from present effects to prior (perhaps
hidden, perhaps just unrecorded) causes, via the
application of normic statements. Now the significance
of this activity is that it presupposes a
non-conventional division of the class of law-like
statements into those which are and those which are not
capable of functioning in this way, i.e. into those which
are accepted (for transfactual application) and those
which are still under test. Now once we allow this the
postulated symmetries between explanation and prediction
and explanation and falsification break down. And it
becomes important to distinguish between two kinds of
prediction conflated in deductivism's syntactical account
of science: practical predictions of categorical form
which are rarely made in science but which are important
in some of its practical applications in open systems and
about which the applied scientist can never be
deductively certain; and test predictions of hypothetical
form made under effectively closed conditions in order to
test a theoretical hypothesis or putative law.
It is easy to see why the explanation/falsification
symmetry collapses once we allow the legitimacy of
retrodiction. For the activity of retrodiction
presupposes the truth and applicability of the law used;
the possibility that it is false is ruled out a
priori. Now the intelligibility of falsification depends
upon the idea that the would-be falsifier has independent
grounds for the occurrence of the initial conditions. If
the legitimacy of retrodiction is denied a vicious
regress back to sense-experience ensues. Thus suppose we
have a law-like statement of the form S_1 `whenever
events of type E_0 occur events of type E_1 occur'. For
S_1 to be used to explain the occurrence of E_1 in a way
which is consistent with the idea of its being subject to
falsification independent grounds for E_0 are required,
say G_0. But the connection between E_0 and G_0 is itself
a contingent causal one,
136 A Realist Theory of Science
which may be represented by the hypothesis S, `whenever
events of type G_0 occur events of type E_0 occur'.
Hence we need independent grounds for the occurrence of
G_0, say G'_0, if our use of S_2, is to be consistent
with the idea of its falsifiability. But as G'_0 stands
in a contingent causal relationship we need independent
grounds for it too, and so on.... There is of course
only one connection with E_0 which, being non-causal and
non-contingent, does not require independent grounds,
namely immediate sense-experience. Thus insistence on
independent grounds for the initial conditions of an
explanation, which is an inevitable consequence of the
idea of its susceptibility to falsification, inevitably
leads to the requirement that the initial conditions be
apprehended in sense-experience; in which case the event
could have been predicted. The root of the trouble here
is that the causal relationship is taking too much
strain: it is required both to be contingent (and as such
to be subject to falsification) and to explain; functions
that it cannot combine without vicious regress to
sense-experience. Once we distinguish between open and
closed systems, however, this regress can be avoided.
For we may allow that events may be explained in open and
closed systems alike, but that law-like statements may
only be falsified under effectively closed conditions
(where deductive test predictions are possible).
Now the point of the explanation/prediction symmetry
thesis is vitiated in open systems. For we can give
excellent explanations, in virtue of the transfactual
applicability of our independently validated knowledge,
where we are incapable of any predictions (save perhaps
of the most immediate or the most tentative sort).
Moreover the kinds of statements involved in the two
activities are radically different: explanation
proceeding by way of normic, and prediction by way of
empirical, statements. An empirical generalization
typically merely generalizes the problem to be explained,
whereas a normic statement locates it in the context of
an explanatory theory. On the other hand, normic
statements may be inferior predictors to the most crude
generalizations or rules of thumb. Further, the
occurrence of the event itself may be a practically
necessary condition of our knowledge of the former state
of the system, as in the case of the collapse of a bridge
or an airplane crash, or even of the kind of system with
which one is concerned, as in the case of the
Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 137
sudden onset of uncontrollable hysteria.20 Again, the
intelligibility of much practical science of an
exploratory kind, such as prospecting for oil, depends
upon the existence of a radical asymmetry between
explanation and prediction. Because of such difficulties
defenders of the symmetry thesis have been forced to
modify it so that it requires only that were we to be in
possession of all the information available at the time
of the explanation then we could have predicted it.21 Now
I have argued in 2.6 that it is possible to give a
complete explanation of an event without thereby being in
a position to deduce it, namely if the different
generative mechanisms at work are of radically different
kinds; so that the reformulated symmetry thesis is either
false or, if deducibility is built into the definition of
`explanation', uninterestingly tautologous.22 One further
point on prediction. We are only deductively justified
in predicting an event if the system is closed. But
there is no way of knowing in advance (at the only time
when a prediction is relevant) whether the conditions for
a closure will in fact be satisfied. Hence the
probability of an event's occurrence can never be 1.
20 Cf. M. Scriven, `Explanation, Prediction and Laws',
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III,
eds. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, esp. pp. 176-90.
21 See e.g. A. Grunbaum, `Temporally Asymmetric
Principles, Parity between Explanation and Prediction and
Mechanism versus Teleology', Philosophy of Science
Delaware Seminar, Vol. I, ed. B. Baumrin, p. 73.
22 The interesting question is then of course shifted to
that of whether complete explanations must be
`deductive'. Most of the early objections to the
deductive model turned on the non-availability of
generalisations connecting events like the cracking of
radiators or missile failures. Although this was no
doubt encouraged by the way in which its advocates
presented it, it was somewhat disingenuous of its critics
not to realise the possibility of sophisticated
reformulations of it. Mandelbaum, for example, has
argued correctly that such events must be regarded as
complex and analysed into components (M. Mandelbaum,
`Historical Explanation: The Problem of Covering Laws',
History of Theory, Vol. I, pp. 229-42). However he still
sees explanation as depending upon a knowledge of laws
(which he interprets in the Humean way) covering the
component events (ibid., p. 241); and given this, the
complex event itself still remains deductively
predictable. I have argued, by contrast, that the laws
covering the components are normic and that they may
involve reference to radically different kinds (so that
they cannot be incorporated within a single theory).
Hence the complex event, even though completely
explained, may not be deducible.
138 A Realist Theory of Science
The undifferentiated ontology of received philosophy
of science results in the very damaging view expressed in
(v) on page 64 above, viz. that the acid test of a theory
is its predictive power. On this view the more accurate
a theory's predictions - no matter of what or where - the
more worthwhile it is retaining. Coupled with
permissiveness over the use of the CP clause, such a
position provides a powerful rationale for scientific
conservatism of any school. It has been used as such by
Heisenberg in physics and Skinner in psychology, by
Friedman in economics and Osiander in astronomy. But
armed with our concept of a complex and differentiated
reality we can see what is wrong with it. For, on the
one hand, there will always be more than one hypothesis
capable of saving any given set of facts, so independent
tests for them will always be necessary; and, on the
other, it is only under closed conditions that such tests
can be decisive. Consistency with the facts is neither
necessary nor sufficient for a theory.
Popper does not seem to see the connection between
the criteria of explanation and rationality he expouses
and the historicist view of social science he condemns.
That there is a connection is clear. For if we know that
power corrupts and regard this as a true, if trivial,
empirical generalization then given only a knowledge of
the initial condition that N is powerful we can predict
with deductive certainty that N will be corrupted. On
the other hand if we cannot know when the initial
condition is satisfied the law cannot be applied and so
is quite useless for either explanatory or social
engineering purposes. If Popper is committed to thesis
(3) in social science he is committed to thesis (4) and
so to the historicist view of science as the prediction
of events (savoir, pour prevoir). Popper nowhere denies
the applicability of thesis (8) to social science.23 But
he equivocates between a conception of historicism as the
view that the aim of the social sciences is the
prediction of future events24 and the view that its aim
is to make unconditional historical prophecies.26
23 On the contrary he repeatedly emphasises the
essential similarity in the logical form of the natural
and the social sciences. According to him what is
peculiar to the latter is its subject matter, and to
history its interest in the particular (see K. R.
Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, p. 143). But the
pattern of explanation is the same.
24 See e.g. ibid., p 3.
25 See e.g. K. R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, p. 339.
Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 139
But the authors he attacks did not make unconditional
historical prophecies: Hegel in fact made no predictions,
and Marx only conditional ones. Popper's real argument
is not against predictability as such in social science,
but against the predictability of certain kinds of social
events, viz. large-scale social changes and their
consequences. It is an argument against certain theories
of social becoming which he interprets historistically.
Indeed one could almost say it is an argument for an
a-historical form of historicism (in which the laws
involved are regarded as strictly universal) against an
historical one (in which they are regarded as
spatio-temporally restricted). Historicism is in general
invalid in all its forms. And it is invalid in both
natural and social science. And for exactly the same
reasons. Incidentally, this is true for the refutation
of historicism that Popper derives from the logical
impossibility of predicting the precise effects of future
knowledge in as much as any such prediction depends upon
a knowledge of that knowledge.26 For its effects on
nature are no less predictable than its effects on men.27
I turn now to the central unifying theory of
explanation, viz thesis (3) and the theories of
causality, viz. (2)' and (2)", that underlie it.
Consider once more the paradigm of the kind of context in
which a causal claim is made. `Why is the door opening?'
`Because Tania's pushing it'. Now it is certainly not
the case that in saying `Tania's pushing it caused the
door to open' we mean that every time Tania pushes it the
door opens. For there are times when it is locked and
times when she must turn the door knob too. (Nor equally
is it the case that every time the door opens is it
because Tania pushes it.) But neither could we produce
any universal law which would show why the door opened in
this particular case. Generally, theories (2)' and (2)"
are only plausible if in the case of (2)' we mean to
imply and in the case of (2)" we have grounds for
supposing that a closure has been obtained of the system
in which the events occur. Without this we cannot
possibly mean nor can we reasonably be
26 K. R. Popper, Poverty of Historicism, pp. vi-vii.
27 Indeed one could even go so far as to say that the
latter depends upon the former; that is, that it is only
in so far as the effects of future knowledge are
unpredictable on nature than they are unpredictable on
men, in as much as all human action has a physical aspect
but the converse is not the case. A social closure
presupposes a natural one but not vice versa; there could
be a nature without men, but not men without a nature.
140 A Realist Theory of Science
committed to showing that the events which we claim are
causally connected are so in virtue of being constantly
conjoined. In short the Humean theory cannot be a
general theory of causality but at best a theory of what
is involved in the making of causal claims in closed
systems and where the events are separately identifiable
atomistic instants.
Davidson has proposed a sophisticated reformulation
of the Humean theory. `It is an error', he says, `to
think that no explanation has been given until a law has
been produced. Linked with [it] is the idea that singular
causal statements necessarily indicate, by the concepts
they employ, the concepts that will occur in the entailed
law. Suppose a hurricane which is reported on page 5 of
Tuesday's Times causes the event reported on page 13 of
Wednesday's Tribune. Should we look for a law relating
events of these kinds? It is only slightly less
ridiculous to look for a law relating hurricanes and
catastrophies. The laws needed to predict the
catastrophy with precision would, of course, have no use
for concepts like hurricanes and catastrophies'.28
Davidson's analysis of `singular causal statements' is as
follows: ` "A caused B" is true if and only if there are
descriptions of A and B such that the sentences obtained
by putting these descriptions for "A" and "B" in "A
caused B" follows from a true causal law'.29 The
objection to this suggestion is that it places a
requirement on the verification of causal claims which is
(a) impossible, (b) useless, and (c) unnecessary. For,
on it, `A' and `B' stand in, in the original causal
claim, for the complete atomistic state-descriptions that
would form the antecedents and consequents of such a
causal law. But it is presumably only because (at least
from a Humean viewpoint) we have not got and perhaps
cannot get such state-descriptions that we make the
original causal claim in the first case. Davidson holds
that such claims are defended by `producing a relevant
law or giving reasons for believing such exists'.80 How?
then would one set about defending a claim about the
causes of the French Revolution? By giving grounds for
believing that a true
28 D. Davidson, `Actions, Reasons and Causes', Journal
of Philosophy 1963, reprinted in ed. A. White, Philosophy
of Action, p. 92
29 Ibid, p. 92. See also D. Davidson, `Causal
Relations', Journal of Philosophy 1969, p. 701.
30 D. Davidson, `Actions, Reasons and Causes', p. 92.
Actualism and the Concept of a Closure 141
`neurological, chemical or physical law'31 exists ? But
such laws, were they to be known, would cover any set of
historical causes of the French Revolution; in short,
they would not enable us to discriminate between true and
false causal claims at the level we are concerned with;
that is, at the level at which the initial causal claim
is made. Neurological laws are consistent with any
social event and so cannot be possibly used to defend
specific causal claims involving people. Worse still, in
the end the only way of defending the belief that a
Humean causal law exists covering some particular case
will be by appealing to the truth of regularity
determinism. Hence the defense of the most specific
causal claim becomes an expression of faith in the
philosophical dogma that the world is so constituted that
the simple formula `same cause, same effect' everywhere
applies. On the other hand, once we deny the premise
that a causal claim entails a Humean causal law, and
hence a closed system, these absurdities can be avoided;
and we can then allow that causal claims are defended,
where they require justification in terms of general
statements at all, by an appeal to the normic statements
of the level at which the original causal claim was made.
Hempel makes a similar mistake in arguing that
singular causal statements of the `q because p' (man
bites dog) type `claim by implication', `tacitly
presuppose', or `assert by implication' the existence of
covering laws.32 Now it is not clear from his account
whether he regards this as part of the meaning of the
original causal claim (cf. thesis (2)' above) or merely
as indicating the way in which it is to be justified
(cf. thesis (2)' above). If the former we have the
absurdity that `man' and `dog' change their meaning when
they are used in the making of a causal claim. If the
latter a confusion between what it is necessary to know
to ascribe causes and what is necessary for our knowledge
of the ascription of causes to be possible, viz. that
certain underlying laws hold. The latter is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the former.
The non-availability of Humean causal laws is
undoubtedly an embarrassment to the modern
Humean. Inevitably he falls back on the idea that our
explanations are sketches to be filled out in the
fullness of time (cf. strong actualism) or that they are
31 D. Davidson, ibid., p. 93.
32 C. G. Hempel, op. cit., pp. 360, 362 and 363.
142 A Realist Theory of Science
subject to an implicit ceteris paribus clause (cf. weak
actualism). In addition he may relax the stringencies of
the deductive model by allowing other categories of
explanation: such as statistical, elliptical and partial
formulations.33 Statistical explanations, however, spoil
the point of the deductive model: for, as Scriven has put
it, `they abandon the hold on the individual case'.34
Moreover there is no a priori reason to suppose that the
world is not statistically open.35 As for the other
categories: all explanations, contextually speaking, are
elliptical; and the deductivist must show how partial
explanations can be universally applicable.
At the methodological level one of the most
unfortunate consequences of the spell of actualism is the
blurring of the real differences that exist between the
various sciences: both in their subject matters and the
degrees to which they have achieved knowledge of them.
The experimental sciences have been able as a result of
theoretical endeavour and technical ingenuity, to carve
out a chunk of the uncontrolled world and use it as an
object of inquiry. The non-experimental scientist has no
such easy access. Now the view of the world as closed
sets him off in the wrong direction - for it sets him
looking for a complete description of a given field. A
view of the world as open can, on the other hand,
concentrate his endeavours enormously. For it means that
all he has to do is to identify and describe (in ways to
be considered later) some interesting and significant
object of inquiry, without supposing that this will
enable him to make deductively successful predictions.
33 C. G. Hempel, op. cit., pp. 376ff and pp. 415ff.
34 M. Scriven, `Truisms as the Grounds for Historical
Explanation', p. 465.
35 The question of the closure of systems is distinct
from that of their statistical or non-statistical
properties. The latter turns on the deducibility of
single as distinct from mass events; whereas the former
turns on the stability of empirical relationships.
Clearly statistical systems can be open or closed.
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